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Concepts related to interest, curiosity, and learning motivation appear in a wide swath of 
scholarship. This chapter develops a perspective on curiosity that is grounded in modern models 
of motivation and emotion. A functional approach seeks to understand human curiosity in terms 
of the functions it serves for near-term adaptation and long-term human development. I suggest 
that curiosity serves three related functions: (1) it motivates people to learn for its own sake; (2) 
it serves as a counterweight to anxiety, which motivates avoiding new things; and (3) it serves as 
a counterweight to enjoyment, which motivates sticking with tried-and-true sources of reward. 
The chapter ends by considering some definitional issues (such as whether “interest” and 
“curiosity” are different states), exploring relationships between curiosity and other emotional 
states (e.g., surprise, confusion, and awe), and examining individual differences related to 
curiosity. 
 





If anything defines the human condition, it is our ability to immerse ourselves in inane and 
nonsensical things. Unlike other animals, we can be motivated to spend our energy and hours on 
the hopelessly impractical things that will never put money in our wallets, food in our tummies, 
or mates in our beds. Much of what we do and learn is practical, of course, but unlike almost all 
other animals, people can transcend daily life’s practical problems when investing their time and 
brainpower. 
 
As the history of research on human motivation shows (Bolles, 1967; Silvia, 2012), scientists 
have grappled with the family of concepts captured by curiosity since psychology’s early days. 
In modern times, concepts related to interest, curiosity, and learning motivation appear in a wide 
swath of scholarship, from genetics to classroom instruction to literary analysis (Silvia, 2006). In 
this chapter, I step back to look at the bigger picture of curiosity. My aim is not to review or 
integrate such disparate fields. Instead, I want to discuss a perspective on curiosity that is 
grounded in modern models of motivation and emotion. These models do not solve all the 
problems that human curiosity poses, but they do try to analyze curiosity at a fundamental and 
general level instead of within a narrow domain (e.g., vocational decisions or classroom 
learning). 
 
After considering how the modern science of motivation and emotion views curiosity, we will 
consider some of its implications. Some definitional issues that have bedeviled research on 
interest and curiosity, for example, can be clarified by a basic analysis of how curiosity works. 
Likewise, the thorny nature of individual differences in interest and curiosity can be unpacked 
and illuminated. 
 
Why Are People so Curious? A Functional Analysis 
 
Why are humans curious at all? Plenty of the world’s creatures seem wholly incurious: they eat, 
sleep, and mate. Many animals, particularly mammals, show behavioral expressions of curiosity 
that we humans recognize (e.g., Darwin, 1872/1998), such as experimenting with objects, 
exploring new places and things, and playing. But all of us animals are the product of a long 
evolutionary process, so the distribution of curiosity as a motivational system across species 
must tell us something fundamental about it. 
 
This is the starting point of a functional approach, which seeks to understand human curiosity in 
terms of the functions it serves for near-term adaptation and long-term human development 
(Keltner & Gross, 1999; Parrott, 2001). My ideas about the functions of curiosity are heavily 
influenced by Izard’s (1977) model of human emotions, which views emotions as evolved 
psychobiological systems that have adaptive roles in human development. His functional view is 
widespread in modern emotion science. Most modern theories view emotions as having 
motivational qualities that organize behaviors necessary to confront humans’ major adaptational 
challenges (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Panksepp, 1998; Scherer, 2001; Tomkins, 1962). 
 
Curiosity, in Izard’s view, is captured by the basic emotion of interest–excitement. (Curiosity and 
interest are essentially synonymous in this model.) Like all the basic emotions, interest is innate, 
in the sense of being unlearned and universal—people are not taught to be curious. And like all 
emotions, interest accomplishes something for people. Some emotions have obvious functions, 
such as fear’s preparation for fighting or fleeing, but others have more subtle functions that 
reflect long-range social or developmental goals (Abe & Izard, 1999). Interest’s functions are 
both obvious and subtle, and they can be viewed as a family of intertwined functions. 
 
Function 1: Interest Motivates Learning 
 
Some species have little need for learning: many animals, from seahorses to salamanders, are 
born more or less ready for the challenges they will face in their environments. Being born ready 
has its virtues, but the trade-off is behavioral rigidity. Such creatures are behaviorally inflexible, 
and their limited ability to learn prevents them from capitalizing on acquired experience. On the 
other hand, other creatures, such as humans, are born ignorant but with an awe-inspiring ability 
to learn. Here we see the other side of the trade-off. Humans are born helpless and incompetent, 
and we remain dependent on adults for an unusually long developmental period. But our ability 
to learn allows us to capitalize on experience, act flexibly, and leverage cultural knowledge 
passed along from adults. 
 
The emotion of interest, in Izard’s view, is an engine of learning. Curiosity is what gives us our 
hungry minds. It is the motivational system that ensures that humans will engage with the 
environment, enjoy learning, and seek out new experiences and ideas (Abe & Izard, 1999). If 
they have a system that motivates learning for its own sake, people do not need to be born with 
much innate knowledge—they will inevitably want to learn because they are easily bored and 
will enjoy exploring new things. 
 
It is telling that the emotion of interest appears so early in development. Developmental research 
on emotion shows that, across the globe, emotions appear in a fixed order during infancy 
(Izard, 1978). At birth, newborns show—as all parents know—an eerily effective distress 
system. But they also show a nascent form of disgust (e.g., rejecting bad-tasting objects from the 
mouth) and a well-developed form of interest. At birth, infants show selective attention, both to 
human faces (aiding social bonding and social learning) and to events that are novel and 
changing. From the beginning, the human baby’s mind is hungry. 
 
Across the lifespan, our curious minds motivate us to learn. The allure of the new, the vexation 
of boredom, and the desire to learn foster long-term developmental projects, such as acquiring 
complex skills and mastering large bodies of knowledge (Fiske & Maddi, 1961). Without the 
intrinsic motivation to explore inherent in curiosity, it would be hard to acquire the complex 
competencies that adults have . 
 
Function 2: Interest Serves as a Motivational Counterweight to Anxiety 
 
The emotion of fear serves the noble goal of keeping us safe by promoting caution and wariness 
(Lazarus, 1991). It is not irrational to fear new foods, new places, new things, and new people. 
New things can be, and quite often are, harmful to us. Feelings of fear thus motivate avoidance: 
anxious people do not approach, seek out, or engage with unfamiliar things. But what would 
happen if we always avoided unfamiliar things? New foods, new places, new things, and new 
people can be fascinating and rewarding, so our wariness would make us miss out. 
 
Motivation science has a long history of emphasizing push–pull conflicts between motivational 
states (Atkinson, 1964; Bolles, 1967). The tension between anxiety and curiosity is a classic 
case, one emphasized by most of the theories of curiosity that come from motivation science 
(e.g., Berlyne, 1960, 1971; Kashdan, 2004, 2009; Spielberger & Starr, 1994; Tomkins, 1962). 
Avoiding new things keeps us safe, but it prevents us from cultivating knowledge and expertise: 
we cannot learn new things without trying new things. Conversely, curiosity motivates us to 
explore new things, but it exposes us to their real risks. 
 
One of the functions of interest, then, is to serve as a counterweight to anxiety. Because new 
things can be scary, the motivational system needs an appetitive, approach-oriented mechanism 
for overcoming wariness and making new things appealing. 
 
Function 3: Interest Serves as a Motivational Counterweight to Enjoyment 
 
Fear of the unfamiliar is not the only barrier to exploring new things. Attachments to the familiar 
are a less obvious but probably stronger barrier to engaging with novelty. The emotion of 
happiness does many things (Fredrickson, 1998), but a key function is to build attachments to 
people and things that evoke it (Tomkins, 1962). When an activity is enjoyable, people develop 
positive attitudes toward it and expect that doing it again will evoke similar happy feelings. A 
tension thus exists between trying something new and trying something that has always been fun. 
 
The motivational conflict between interest and enjoyment is fascinating. It has been discussed by 
several emotion theories (Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962), but it is counterintuitive and has not 
received much attention in the study of curiosity and interest (Turner & Silvia, 2006). Happiness 
motivates people to stick with the sure bet, to go with what was safe and fun and rewarding the 
last time. Interest, in contrast, motivates people to go out on a limb, to try something new. 
 
One way to see the conflict between interest and enjoyment is to expose people to creepy and 
unseemly things. In one of our studies (Turner & Silvia, 2006), we asked the participants to view 
a broad set of Western paintings. Some of the images were familiar and calming, such as nature 
landscapes or impressionistic art. Other images, however, were disturbing, creepy, or upsetting 
(e.g., Francisco Goya’s Saturn Devouring His Children and Francis Bacon’s Head Surrounded 
by Sides of Beef). For each painting, people rated their feelings of interest and enjoyment as well 
as ratings of the images’ familiarity, novelty, and disturbingness. Overall, interest and enjoyment 
were unrelated. Appraising images as new and unfamiliar predicted higher interest but lower 
enjoyment—unfamiliar things were interesting but not pleasant. Likewise, the disturbing images 
were much more interesting—but much less pleasant—than the conventional ones. Thus, while 
interest and enjoyment commonly go together, they represent different emotions with distinct 
functions. 
 
The tug of the familiar versus the allure of the new appears whenever people have to choose 
between what they like and what they not yet tried. When people want to go out to eat, do they 
go to their favorite place that they always enjoy, or do they try the new place that just opened 
next door? The new place might be better, so trying something new could uncover a new source 
of reward. But it might be disappointing or foul, so trying something new has a big opportunity 
cost when there is a sure thing. Even when people choose their favorite restaurant, do they pick 
what they always pick, or do they try something new? 
 
As a pair, fear and enjoyment are major barriers to trying new things. Fear motivates wariness 
and avoidance of unfamiliar things; happiness motivates attachments to tried-and-true sources of 
pleasure. Curiosity thus motivates people to engage in new things despite both the potential cost 
of the action (i.e., it could be harmful) and the opportunity cost of forsaking the sure thing. 
 
Curiosity’s Conceptual Cousins 
 
Viewing curiosity as an evolved psychobiological emotional-motivational system relocates it. 
Researchers have tended to group curiosity together with the family of positive emotions 
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). This is sensible because both interest and enjoyment are appetitive 
and approach-oriented emotions, and the subjective experience of curiosity is a pleasing feeling 
of being activated, immersed, and absorbed (Izard, 1977). 
 
But one could also view curiosity as a member of the family of knowledge emotions , a group of 
emotions associated with learning and exploring (Keltner & Shiota, 2003; Silvia, 2010). Some 
emotions have metacognitive roots: they are evoked when people appraise aspects of their 
knowledge. Surprise, for example, stems from appraising an event as unexpected 
(Scherer, 2001), and interest follows when people further appraise the unexpected thing as within 
their capacity to understand (Silvia, 2005, 2008). Confusion stems from appraising an 
unexpected, unfamiliar thing as essentially beyond one’s ability to master or understand 
(Silvia, 2010, 2013). And awe, perhaps the most obscure of the knowledge emotions, comes 
from encountering something that cannot be assimilated to existing knowledge and thus requires 
accommodation (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2014). 
 
One virtue of thinking of curiosity as a member of an emotion family is that it highlights its 
similarities with other motivational states. I find the relationship between interest and awe 
particularly intriguing. One possibility is that awe is simply the most intense pole of interest. 
Izard (1977) labeled the intense form of interest fascination , and some researchers have 
speculated that feelings of awe and wonder are what intense interest feels like (Campos, Shiota, 
Keltner, Gonzaga, & Goetz, 2013; Silvia, Fayn, Nusbaum, & Beaty, 2015). The subjective 
experience of awe—a feeling of being absorbed, immersed, and captivated—certainly has the 
hallmarks of interest’s motivational function of exploration and engagement. On the other hand, 
perhaps awe represents a family of states that are sufficiently different in their origins and 
functions. For example, part of awe is a transcendent experience of feeling moved and touched 
(Bonner & Friedman, 2011; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2014), which seems outside of our common 
understanding of interest and curiosity. In any case, the relationships between curiosity and other 
emotions deserve more attention. 
 
Implications for Concepts and Terms 
 
We noted earlier that a functional analysis of curiosity is fundamental: it seeks to explain it using 
basic science models of motivation and emotion. Such models view curiosity as an innate system 
that motivates learning and exploration for its own sake. Thinking of curiosity as part of 
humanity’s evolved motivational architecture can shed some light on how we define and talk 
about it. 
 
In particular, some domains of interest research have drawn some sharp differences between 
curiosity and interest (for a review, see Grossnickle, 2016) or between types of interest (e.g., 
cognitive vs. emotional; Harp & Meyer, 1997). In motivation research, however, curiosity and 
interest are seen as synonymous, and I think a unitary view is more fruitful for understanding 
curiosity across all of psychology’s domains. The English language gives different senses to 
these words, to be sure, but we should not be led astray by our lexicon. People tend to 
use curious to describe upcoming events (“I am curious to hear what he has to say”) or to refer to 
a stable quality of a person (“She is such a curious child”). Interest seems to appear more often 
to refer to ongoing or past experiences (“That was just so interesting!”). Usage has changed over 
time, however, which is a clue that we should not read too much into words. Curious, for 
example, was once common in contexts in which now only interesting, amazing, 
or puzzling would appear (e.g., “What a curious spectacle!” or “I saw the most curious thing on 
the tram this morning”; see “curious, adj.,” entry 16a, OED, 2016), and interest is still an 
allowable word for stable dispositions (“My daughter is interested in so many things”). 
 
The psychobiology of curiosity does not support the notion of distinct interest and curiosity 
systems (DeYoung, 2013; Panksepp, 1998; Zuckerman, 1994). Instead, I think that curiosity—
like all things that are profoundly important to people—is widely lexicalized in language so that 
people can talk flexibly about a complex and pressing topic (Cruse, 2011). 
 
Stable Aspects of Curiosity: The Specific and the General 
 
Stable aspects of curiosity are tackled in other chapters in this volume, but they are worth 
mentioning here. In my own work, I have argued that a comprehensive analysis of interest 
should have something to say both about momentary emotional states (e.g., finding things 
interesting and feeling curious in the moment) and about stable aspects of motivation 
(Silvia, 2006; Silvia & Kashdan, 2009, in press). Curiosity can be stable in two senses: a 
concrete one and a general one. For the most part, researchers in education have focused on the 
former, and researchers in personality and neuroscience have focused on the latter. 
 
In the concrete sense of stable, we have people’s unique and specific “interests.” Education 
researchers have been the most forward-looking in this respect, having emphasized the 
difference between situational interest and individual interest several decades ago (e.g., 
Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992). Individual interests are narrow domains of activity that people 
find interesting, valuable, and rewarding. Hobbies are perhaps the best example of how 
idiosyncratic such interests can be, such as when one meets people who collect Waltham 1883 
model pocket watches, participate in Civil War reenactments, or develop recipes for fermenting 
their own kombucha. More widely studied, however, are academic and occupational interests. 
Interest researchers view individual interests as having a cluster of features: finding the domain 
interesting is clearly one, but valuing and knowing a lot about the domain are just as central 
(Hidi & Renninger, 2006; Schiefele, 2009). Individual interests essentially resemble concepts 
from other sides of psychology, such as the personal goals and personal strivings discussed in 
research on personality and motivation (Emmons, 1986, 1999). How people’s quirky hobbies 
and interests develop is a vexing problem that has bedeviled theories of motivation (for a review, 
see Silvia, 2006). 
 
The general sense in which curiosity is stable—variation in “trait curiosity”—is much easier to 
study and understand. In this approach, researchers have identified and studied broad between-
person individual differences in curiosity. The trait approach assumes that some people are more 
curious than others, although this could mean many things: they experience curiosity more often 
(frequency), they experience curiosity more strongly when they feel it (intensity), or they need 
less input for curiosity to be sparked (sensitivity). 
 
A small but intriguing strand of research on trait curiosity has examined the genetics and 
neuroscience of curiosity, often in nonhuman animals. This line of work has explored heritable 
variation in genes related to novelty seeking, such as variants in the family of dopamine receptor 
genes (DeYoung, 2013). Traits associated with curiosity show substantial heritability in 
behavioral genetics studies (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001; Zuckerman, 1994). These differences 
are in turn apparent in the brain when people do tasks involving imagination, novelty, and 
exploration (e.g., Beaty et al., 2016). 
 
The larger strand of research on trait curiosity, however, has sought to identify traits related to 
curiosity, develop valid measures of them, and then understand their meaning and implications. 
Some researchers have focused simply on trait-like curiosity (e.g., Kashdan et al., 2009; 
Spielberger & Starr, 1994). Other researchers have funneled in on likely facets of trait curiosity, 
such as facets reflecting specific or diversive curiosity, or facets reflecting exploration motivated 
by interest versus uncertainty (e.g., Litman & Jimerson, 2004; Litman & Spielberger, 2003). 
 
More commonly, however, researchers have examined broader traits in which curiosity is a facet. 
The Big Five tradition, for example, locates curiosity within openness to experience , one of the 
major dimensions of personality (Goldberg, 1990; McCrae, 1994). There are many models of 
openness to experience (for reviews, see Oleynick et al., 2017; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2017), but 
curiosity is important to all of them. Central to openness to experience is an interest in new 
things, a willingness to explore new ideas, people, and places. 
 
People high in openness to experience show higher curiosity in a wide range of contexts. They 
are more likely to find unusual art and music interesting, to try foreign food, to visit other 
countries, to enjoy intellectual ideas, and to seek graduate education, among other things (e.g., 
McCrae & Sutin, 2009). Similarly, people high in openness to experience are much more likely 
to generate new things. Openness to experience strongly predicts everyday creativity. In 
experience sampling (Silvia et al., 2014) and daily diary (Conner & Silvia, 2015) studies, for 
example, people high in openness are much more likely to be spending time on creative goals 
and hobbies. And openness predicts creativity at the sociocultural level as well: people high in 
openness to experience have more creative accomplishments over the lifespan (Feist & 
Barron, 2003). Curious people thus seek out, enjoy, and create novelty. 
 
We can think of traits like openness to experience as parameters that tilt the scales of curiosity 
versus anxiety. In their model, Spielberger and Starr (1994) proposed that personality traits shift 
the relative weight of approach and avoidance motivation when people are faced with new 
things. Traits like openness to experience and sensation seeking, for example, incline people 
toward exploration; traits like anxiety and neuroticism, in contrast, incline people toward 
avoidance. By inclining people toward exploration, openness to experience fosters learning and 
creativity. At the same time, some things in life should be left unexplored, and openness to 
experience does increase the likelihood that people will delve into behaviors and situations that 




Wanting to know something for its own sake, wanting to do something simply because it is 
interesting—this is part of human nature. In this chapter, we explored a functional analysis of 
curiosity. Modern models of motivation and emotion have much to say about the role of interest 
in learning, adaptation, and development. Fundamentally, curiosity motivates the enormous 
amount of learning that people need to do. Over time, people develop the skills and knowledge 
needed to flourish because they enjoy learning and are easily bored. Although some people are 
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